Mike Hancock News
The Arab Spring, Libya and Europe
The Arab Spring, Libya and Europe
By Michael Hancock, MP
Vice-Chairman of the Political Committee, European Security and Defence Assembly
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), also known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, has not been at its best recently. The belated and timid reaction to the historic events unravelling in the Arab world has revealed the weaknesses of the post-Lisbon Union. The EU is struggling to confirm itself as an actor to be reckoned with and as a bloc defending the interests of its 500 million citizens. The new Treaty has so far failed to re-invigorate the Union.
The lack of unity among leading EU member states when voting in the UN Security Council on the resolution to protect Libya's civilian population served as a strong reminder of how the continent remains haunted by its past and still fails to forge joint positions when it really counts. Although the conflict is on our doorstep and despite the fact that European countries are the main consumers of Libyan oil and gas, it would appear that at no point was any serious consideration given to making use of CSDP instruments. For example, although the evacuation of civilians falls within the remit of the Petersberg tasks which are recognised by the Lisbon Treaty, the member states chose rather to organise their own separate evacuation operations and made no use of the EU instruments created for that purpose.
As regards the delivery of humanitarian aid to people in Libya, the EU has put itself in an impossible position whereby others - in this case the UN Agency for Humanitarian Aid - determine whether the EU will be able to carry out the humanitarian mission it has decided upon. This is certainly not what was intended when the ESDP/CSDP was created. If the EU wants to be the global player it claims to be, it needs to be able to act autonomously when our interests are at stake. The crisis in North Africa and in Libya in particular is also a European problem and Europe should act accordingly. As things stand now, the EU is not even capable of confirming its reputation of at least being a wielder of soft power that can transform regimes, countries and regions. Currently, it is at best a bystander, while others - member states as well as other institutions - influence and shape events.
The EU should seek a stronger role in certain key regions, and North Africa is one example where this should be done immediately. We need to respond to the various grassroots revolutions taking place there and see them as an opportunity, not a threat to stability. Currently, the focus is too much on short-term problems, such as an alleged influx of migrants and threatened energy supplies. The EU must mobilise as much as possible, even in times of budgetary constraints, in order to support the people in the region and their aspirations for the rule of law, democracy and social opportunities. This is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to change this part of the world for the better and the fruits of today's investments will be reaped tenfold in the future.
It is also important to be involved as early as possible in the renewal of these societies, not least of all because of the future repercussions of their revolutions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the short term, the new governments will in all likelihood have difficulty containing their peoples' deep-rooted anger against certain policies pursued by Israel, policies that are only superficially sanctioned by the West. While we must respect Israel's security interests, our standing among the people of the Arab world will not improve unless we help bring about lasting change for the Palestinians.
As far as the situation in Libya is concerned, I see three scenarios for the coming months:
- In the first scenario the current military impasse will continue and a low-intensity war will simmer on. Western support for the rebel movement will not include heavy weaponry and there will be no deployment of ground troops to Libya. Moammar Qaddafi's forces will eventually run out of arms and munitions and will have to retreat, but there is no guarantee of this as Qaddafi still has substantial financial resources at his disposal and the arms embargo is far from perfect. Moreover this can take time, too much time for NATO and others to stand by and watch.
- In the second scenario, Qaddafi will withstand the rebel forces and remain in power, keeping control over the western part of the country. This is the scenario of a divided Libya. As a consequence of a ceasefire agreement between the two sides, international buffer forces will be deployed to monitor the line of division. A variant of this scenario is that international mediation will put an end to the fighting and the country will be placed under temporary shared management, with the future option of a referendum on independence for the eastern part. At the UN, NATO and elsewhere, contingency planning for such a scenario has already begun. However, the opposition to Qaddafi is not limited to the eastern part and any planning for the separation scenario should acknowledge that fact.
- The third scenario is one of military escalation. In principle, this would require the UN Security Council to issue a new mandate. It has been argued that the deployment of ground troops to establish protection zones for the civilian population may already be covered by the existing Resolution 1973 which indeed foresees the use of all necessary means to protect the population. Some argue the exclusion of ground forces addresses a large-scale deployment only which would allow the establishment of secure zones (for example in Misrata) with the help of deployed soldiers. Nobody can predict the outcome of a military escalation, but this is the scenario most likely to include the end of Qaddafi.
However, let us not forget what Colin Powell once said: "If you break it, you own it", in particular as we do not know what the intentions of the various groups that make up the Transitional Council really are. Military escalation could lead to a situation like that in Iraq. It will certainly mean a prolonged presence of NATO or of other international forces on the ground.
I do not favour any of these scenarios in particular. I do believe, however, that NATO, the EU and all those who have asked for Qaddafi's removal need to think seriously about the ways and means of breaking the current deadlock. Either they agree to step up their support to the rebels or they agree on negotiations with Qaddafi and his family. Whatever we do, it should be consistent with international law.
Many believe that the scenario of a divided Libya is the easiest and most face-saving option for NATO and the West, and enables the military action to be ended soon.
However, following the successful revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, allowing Qaddafi to remain in power or to control parts of the country may have serious consequences for the other ongoing revolutionary movements, in particular in Bahrain and Syria.
In any case, today, the EU is not in a position to change the tide of events in the region in general or in Libya in particular. Nevertheless, we should not leave Egypt and Tunisia to cope with the massive influx of Libyan refugees on their own: the presence of those people ultimately constitutes a threat to the stability of those countries and to their ongoing transformation and democratic transition.
With my parliamentary colleagues from the European Security and Defence Assembly, I therefore call on the EU to deploy a humanitarian relief operation making use of the EU's civil-military instruments under the CSDP in order to deliver aid to the displaced persons in Egypt and Tunisia who have fled the conflict in Libya. The EU should also prepare a strategy to support these people when the current conflict ends, including assistance for their return. Furthermore, it is important to seek and obtain contributions from Arab countries to implement such a strategy.
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